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Keats the Humanist 
Ernest f. Lovell, ]r., and John Clubbe1 
Of the major Romantic poets, Keats was the latest born, the earliest 
to die, the shortest lived, the most likeable, the most easily lovable. 
His mature creative life was incredibly brief-his first perfect poem, 
"On First Looking into Chapman's Homer," being written in Octo-
ber 1816, his last perfect poem, 'To Autumn," slightly less than 
three years later, on 19 September 1819. In his letters we observe a 
mind functioning at its best over a period of about three years, 
when Keats was aged twenty-one to twenty-four years. On 3 Feb-
ruary 1820 he suffered a violent hemorrhage of the lungs; in Sep-
tember, dying, he sailed for Italy. Keats wrote some of the finest 
letters in the language, but until his illness they are the letters of a 
young man. There was much that he did not have time to read or 
to think about. These few dates suggest the tremendous intensity 
with which, for a startlingly brief period, Keats thought about his 
art and worked to create it. 
Although Keats never systematized his literary theory and the 
thoughts about the nature of human existence that we find scattered 
and evolving in his letters, much of this theory and speculation pos-
sesses a remarkable harmony or unity that derives directly from 
certain basic qualities of his character. Perhaps chief among these 
personal qualities is one easier to name in negative than in positive 
terms: the usual and genuine absence in him of self-assertiveness. 
The dogmatic tone or spirit was not his, and he disliked dogmatic 
men and arguments, believing that it was more blessed to listen, 
learn, and explore than to preach in support of a pre-selected text. 
There is thus an unusual gentleness about Keats's strength of mind. 
Because of the basically explorative thrust of his thinking, he was 
reluctant to reach closed-end conclusions. 
These personal qualities derive finally, it would appear, from 
Keats's stalwart selflessness wholly without neurotic fears or the 
need to feel himself loved by everyone who came his way. In his 
letter to George and Tom Keats of 21, 27(?) December 1817, sand-
wiched between his remarks contrasting Benjamin West's painting 
Death on the Pale Horse with King Lear and his account of Neg-
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ative Capability, is a description of a dinner with Horace Smith, 
"his two brothers" and three other men of literary interests.2 The 
letter suggests how easily Keats moved between the social world 
and the solitary world of literary theory. Of these six men, only 
Horace and James Smith, as co-authors of Rejected Addresses 
(1812) and Horace in London (1813), had any literary reputation. 
John Kingston, who was Deputy Controller of Stamps and to 
whom Wordsworth deferred, was also among those present. By and 
large, they were men of wit and fashion. But Keats felt little or no 
sympathetic identification with them, no admiration for them, no 
desire to become like them. At the age of twenty-two, he was al-
ready his own man, well acquainted with his own identity, feeling 
no need to impress these assembled wits of the fashionable world. It 
made no difference to him that his host Horace Smith, a friend of 
Shelley, was a highly successful satirist and stockbroker or that 
James Smith was reputed to be one of the wittiest of conversation-
alists in an age that elevated conversation to a fine art. "These 
men," Keats observed, 
say things which make one start, without making one feel, 
they are all alike; their manners are alike; they all know fash-
ionables; they have a mannerism in their very eating & 
drinking, in their mere handling a Decanter-They talked of 
Kean & his low company-Would I were with that company 
instead of yours said I to myself! I know such like acquain-
tance will never do for me (I, 193). 
Byron, who said he never drew well with literary men (except Scott 
and Moore), would have agreed. 3 Different as they were, both 
Keats and Byron were men of independent spirit. 
Keats's equally Byronic reluctance to embrace some set of final 
conclusions and then live comfortably with it from that day for-
ward, for better or for worse, may express itself as a kind of simple 
skepticism. Thus in the famous letter to Benjamin Bailey of 22 No-
vember 1817, he is "certain of nothing but" two grandly epic con-
cepts, "the holiness of the Heart's affections and the truth of Imag-
ination" (1, 184) . But four months later, on 13 March 1818, he is 
boldly skeptical of his own skepticism. After referring to his reli-
gious skepticism as a thing well known to Bailey, he in effect denies 
it-"1 do not think myself more in the right than other people"-
and then he qualifies his denial: "I must once for all tell you I have 
4 THE KENTUCKY REVIEW 
not one Idea of the truth of any of my speculations" (I, 242, 243) . 
Keats was not of course a confirmed or philosophic skeptic, deny-
ing the possibility of certain knowledge; it is the questioning, quest-
ing nature of his mind that here expresses itself, his way of protect-
ing himself against the dogmatic utterance of the assertive self. And 
so as a kind of New Year's resolution on 31 December 1818, he 
"made up [his] Mind never to take any thing for granted-but even 
to examine the truth of the commonest proverbs" (II, 18). 
Distrusting, like Blake, the abstracting and deductive faculty of 
the reason as dogmatic and self-assertive, Keats sought other meth-
ods of grasping reality: "I never can feel certain of any truth but 
from a clear perception of its Beauty" (31 Dec. 1818: II, 19). Al-
most inevitably, William Godwin becomes the enemy. Charles 
Wentworth Dilke, the true opposite, not the contrary, of the poet 
of negative capability, is "a Godwin-methodist" (24 Sept. 1819: II, 
213) and elsewhere a "Godwin perfectibil[it]y Man" (14 Oct. 1818: 
I, 397). He "was a Man who cannot feel he has a personal identity 
unless he has made up his Mind about every thing. The only means 
of strengthening one's intellect is to make up one's mind about 
nothing-to let the mind be a thoroughfare for all thoughts" (24 
Sept. 1819: II, 213) . Thus even a preliminary consideration illus-
trates the fact that Keats's skepticism, his open-minded questing 
spirit, the natural enemy and antidote to dogmatic self-assertive-
ness, is linked with such important areas of his thought as religion, 
the nature and function of the imagination, the nature of the self, 
negative capability, and human reason. 
Keats's metaphor of the chameleon poet, a metaphor he took 
from Hazlitt, is also closely tied to all this. Specifically, it appears 
in the absence in him of a strong streak of self-assertiveness, as in 
his distinction in The Fall of Hyperion between true poets and 
"mock lyrists, large self-worshippers I And careless hectorers in 
proud bad verse" (I, 207-208)-perhaps a reference to Byron. "Man 
should not dispute or assert,"· Keats wrote to John Hamilton Reyn-
olds, "but whisper results to his neighbour, and thus ... every 
human might become great, and Humanity ... would become a 
grand democracy" (19 Feb. 1818: I, 232). The world, in short, 
would be transformed. As for himself, he stated, with his usual in-
sight into his own being, "I shall never be a Reasoner because I care 
not to be in the right, when retired from bickering and in a proper 
philosophical temper" (13 March 1818: I, 243). 
Keats's distrust of the disputatious and assertive man, like God-
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win or Dilke, surely explains much about his anticlericalism. As 
early as December 1816 he composed a sonnet "Written in Disgust 
of Vulgar Superstition." He found the Bishop of Lincoln to be "ty-
ran[n]ical" and worse (3 Nov. 1817: I, 178); a parson "must be 
either a Knave or an Ideot" (14 Feb. 1819: II, 63); and the "history" 
of Jesus, the only man Keats knew of with a completely disinter-
ested heart, except for Socrates, was lamentably "written and re-
vised by Men interested in the pious frauds of Religion" (19 March 
1819: II, 80). This is very like Shelley, who more than once paired 
Jesus and Socrates. No wonder that Keats wrote of himself on 22 
December 1818, "I am reckoned lax in my christian principles" (II, 
14). 
But in important ways he was deeply and knowledgeably Chris-
tian, as well as being a close student of the Bible like the other Ro-
mantic poets. He was baptized in the Church of England, and on 
his deathbed his friend Joseph Severn read to him from Jeremy Tay-
lor's Holy Living and Holy Dying. The headmaster of the school at 
Enfield, where Keats was a student from 1803 to 1811, was the Rev. 
John Clarke, who influenced his development. Keats's letter to his 
sister on 31 March 1819, instructing her in preparation for her con-
firmation, demonstrates how very knowledgeable he was of Angli-
can doctrine and of the Bible. In answer to just one of her ques-
tions, he refers her to twelve Biblical passages (II, 49-51). His faith 
in an immortal afterlife seems firm; earthly happiness will then be 
repeated "in a finer tone" (22 Nov. 1817: I, 185). Among "the gran-
deurs of immortality" will be the perfect understanding that the dis-
embodied spirits will have of each other, existing outside space in 
the form of pure intelligence. On this day, 16 December 1818, he 
had "scarce a doubt of immortality of some nature" (II, 5, 4). But 
even more significant and revealing is the fact that two of his most 
famous letters-the Mansion of Life letter and the Vale of Soul-
Making letter- are conceived in important part in Christian terms 
and rest upon Christian assumptions. 
The earlier letter, to Reynolds of 3 May 1818, is centrally con-
cerned with comparing the virtues of Milton and Wordsworth: the 
grounds are explicitly humanitarian or humanistic but implicitly 
they are Christian. Keats saw human life as process or growth of 
mind just as truly and habitually as Wordsworth or Byron. It was a 
movement from innocence to experience and beyond, as in Blake-
and as in Byron's Don Juan, however great the disparities among 
each's respective visions. In life's "large Mansion of Many Apart-
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ments," the first is "the infant or thoughtless Chamber, in which we 
remain as long as we do not think." When we begin to reflect upon 
life we move into "the Chamber of Maiden-Thought," where "we 
become intoxicated with the light and the atmosphere, we see noth-
ing but pleasant wonders, and think of delaying there for ever in 
delight." In that Chamber one also undergoes a "sharpening [of] 
one's vision into the heart <head> and nature of Man." The ex-
perience has the effect of "convincing ones nerves that the World is 
full of Misery and Heartbreak, Pain, Sickness and oppression" (I, 
280, 281). Eventually many doors open out of the Chamber of 
Maiden-Thought, "all dark-all leading to dark passages-We see 
not the ballance of good and evil."4 To this point, Keats believed, 
Wordsworth had come when he wrote Tintem Abbey. Because "his 
Genius is explorative of those dark Passages," it is "deeper" or more 
profound than Milton's (I, 281). He judges Wordsworth to be su-
perior because he has a greater "anxiety for Humanity" and 
"martyrs himself to the human heart" (I, 278-79), into which he has 
thought more deeply and more sympathetically than Milton, even 
though Milton's philosophic powers were surely as great as Words-
worth's. From this Keats concluded that "a mighty providence sub-
dues the mightiest Minds to the service of the time being" (I, 282). 
Quite as significant in the present context is Keats's third and last 
Chamber of Life. Although he gave it but one isolated sentence (he 
says at this time he could describe only two), it is obviously a 
chamber of redemption or salvation. It will be stored with the wine 
and bread of communion, "the wine of love-and the Bread of 
Friendship" (I, 283). 
The great Vale of Soul-Making passage of 21 April 1819 in 
Keats's long journal-letter to George and Georgiana Keats explicitly 
deals with some of the central Christian questions and assump-
tions-the "Protection of Providence" (uncertain), the nature of 
human nature (imperfect), the existence of evil (necessary). "Man is 
originally 'a poor [bare] forked creature,'" like Adam after the Fall, 
and "subject to the same mischances as the beasts of the forest." 
Even if mankind could achieve happiness, Keats argued, the ap-
proach of death would then become intolerable, and the individual 
"would leave this world as Eve left Paradise." "But in truth," Keats 
adds, "I do not at all believe in this sort of perfectibility-the na-
ture of the world will not admit of it" (II, 101). Keats, like Byron, 
also rejected the doctrine of Christ the Redeemer, whose rewards 
are to be had only in heaven. At several points his tough-minded 
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and realistic insight into the nature of human existence recalls 
Byron. 5 But the imperfect creature here described is obviously in 
need of redemption, and Keats provided his own "system of salva-
tion" in his concept of a "World of Pains and troubles" as a "vale 
of Soul-making" (not a vale of tears), which neatly justifies the 
ways of God to man and solves the philosophic problem of evil (II, 
102). Thus closely linked are the principles of poetry and theology. 
Imperfect though man is, however, he comes from God, like 
Adam, and on 21 April1819 Keats's concept of man's divine origin 
was as exalted as William Blake's or that of any other Christian. In-
telligences, as distinct from the souls that will be created, are 
"sparks of the divinity"; they are "atoms of perception ... in short 
they are God," to whom they may return (II, 102). As Blake said, 
"All deities reside in the human breast."6 Because God is One, these 
sparks of the divinity "must feel and suffer in a thousand diverse 
ways" in order to become unique "individual beings," that is, to 
become souls possessed of "the sense of Identity" (II, 102, 103). 
Thus Keats explains the infinite variety of man and, by implication, 
the unique value of each. Man, for both Keats and Blake, is a fallen 
creature, in need of salvation. Keats's "system of salvation," which 
he argues is far grander "than [that of] the chryst<e>ain re-
ligion," is essentially Christian in spirit and in its major assump-
tions (II, 102). 
Keats, with his Christian background, must have found it easy 
to nourish the basically non-assertive, non-dogmatic nature of his 
personality. This background led him to new insights into poetry 
and the nature of "the poetical Character" (I, 386). Esthetic and eth-
ical insights become one. Although he phrases his discussion in 
terms of esthetics (or the psychology of the creative process and 
person), its implications, as with Blake and Shelley, are ethical. The 
egotistical poet~Wordsworth, for example-is both bully and self-
deceived (I, 223). Such a poet, as Keats understood the matter at 
this time, violates the sanctity of other human personalities. Sim-
ilarly, Leigh Hunt's "self delusions are very-lamentable ... . There 
is no greater Sin after the 7 deadly than to flatter oneself into an 
idea of being a great Poet" (11 May 1817: I, 143). Such literary crit-
icism is clearly ethical in its assumptions, and self-deception or self-
flattery became for Keats the worst sin possible for a poet. It be-
came, in effect, the eighth deadly sin, the equivalent of Blake's sin 
of Selfhood. "Complete disinterestedness of Mind" or heart, he 
found, had been possessed only by Socrates and Jesus, great men 
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both, though neither left to posterity writings of their own (19 
March 1819: II, 79, 80). But the great critical insight that Keats's 
sensitivity to egotism allowed him to achieve was his distinction be-
tween the "wordsworthian or egotistical sublime" and the "carnelian 
Poet" of "no Identity" (27 Oct. 1818: I, 387)-or Keats himself. 
One feels it was inevitable that he should have perceived this, for 
Keats was in fact perceiving a fundamental aspect of his own being, 
his fearless selflessness, which would probably have permitted him, 
had he lived, to have excelled marvelously in the drama, creating a 
host of richly diverse characters. 
Although there is early evidence of Keats's capacity for sympa-
thetic identification with that or those outside the self, the 
Chameleon-Poet letter of 27 October 1818 is the first in which the 
phrase (verbally reminiscent of Shelley on Byron)7 appears and thus 
deserves examination in detail. Significantly, the letter opens with a 
celebration of Richard Woodhouse's "friendliness" and goes on al-
most at once to define Keats's kind of poetical character in terms of 
selflessness, the absence of the egotistical-"it has no self" (I, 386, 
387). The implication is that the poet of "the wordsworthian or 
egotistical sublime" is confined, bound by and to itself in subject, 
point of view, and tone. (Note Keats's use of the lower-case "w" for 
Wordsworth's name, as the younger poet symbolically converts the 
older to his own doctrine.) This poet is, like Shakespeare's Ajax, "a 
thing [i.e., a man] per se and stands alone. " By contrast, the 
chameleon Keatsian poet is a being of immense variety and 
breadth, delighting in all levels of existence, unconfined by puritan-
ical or rationalistic restraints. All his imaginative creations, whether 
dark or bright, treacherous or wronged, !ago or Imogen, "end in 
speculation" for the reader and are accompanied by the ranging de-
light he feels in the poet of "no Identity," "no self." This poet is the 
purified Blakean Milton, completely free of the sin of selfhood and 
escaped into or "filling some other Body." For such a poet, "it is a 
wretched thing to confess; but ts a very fact that not one word I 
ever utter can be taken for granted as an opinion growing out of 
my identical nature-how can it, when I have no nature?" Shake-
speare is Keats's example par excellence of the poet who possesses 
Negative Capability. Such a poet quite literally lives not in the 
limited self but in other selves, where is his true home: when "in a 
room with People . .. then not myself goes home to myself: but 
the identity of every one in the room begins to [for so?] to press 
upon me that, I am in a very little time an[ni]hilated-not only 
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among Men; it would be the same in a Nursery of children" (I, 
387) . Thus did Keats carry out, in the great generous depths of his 
being, the Blakean, Christian command: "Selfhood ... must be put 
off & annihilated."8 None of this implies that Keats suffered gladly 
dull or uninteresting persons, "unpleasant human identi-
ties . . . people who have no light and shade." To be in such com-
pany is "a capital punishment" (17 March 1819: II, 77). He was of 
course selective. 
The Byronic and the Shelleyan chameleon poet, each in his dif-
ferent way, could sometimes but not always attain this loss of the 
sense of identity. In his self-pitying "Stanzas written in Dejection-
December 1818, near Naples" Shelley failed. At the end of his jour-
nal kept for Augusta in September 1816 Byron recorded his own 
failure: nothing he had seen in his tour of the Alps had, he said, 
"enabled me to lose my own wretched identity in the majesty & the 
power and the Glory-around-above-& beneath me ."9 Keats's 
poet, by contrast, "is continually in for-and filling some other 
Body-The Sun, the Moon, the Sea and Men and Women ." This is 
the expansionist urge to move outside the self, to unite with that 
which is the not-self, evident in all these poets, and of which one of 
Keats's great expressions is in Endymion, I, 777-815 . Such a selfless 
poet has a "relish of the dark side of things" as well as a "taste for 
the bright one." He delights in all aspects of existence, unlike the 
"virtuous philosop[h]er," who may be shocked within his rigidly 
moralistic system of thought (I, 387). 
The experience of self-annihilation may succeed or fail on any of 
several levels-the imaginative or artistically creative, the spiritual 
or religious, and the purely ethical. Keats could achieve it various-
ly, sometimes as a temporary escape from a sense of unhappiness: 
"if a Sparrow come before my Window I take part in its existence 
and pick about the Gravel" (22 Nov. 1817: I, 186) . He once imag-
ined himself a "Billiard-Ball" (I, 147), which he conceived might 
"have a sense of delight from its own roundness, smoothness volu-
bility & the rapidity of its motion."10 Imaginative identification with 
another object could even lift him out of depression. 'The first 
thing that strikes me on hea[r]ing a Misfortune having befalled 
another is this. Well it cannot be. helped-he will have the pleasure 
of trying the resourses of his spirit'" (I, 186). Here he describes, in 
part, an exercise in empathy. The same letter generalizes, however, 
on an intellectual and abstract level about the difference between 
men of power, "who have a proper self," and men of genius, who 
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are "great as certain ethereal Chemicals operating on the Mass of 
neutral intellect-by [for but] they have not any individuality, any 
determined Character" (I, 184). They function as catalysts, in other 
words, altering the very nature of the relationship between man 
and society. This action is performed most effectively by means of 
poems of epic grandeur-Endymion, for example-written by a 
poet with a dramatic or Shakespearean genius, able to efface him-
self and enter into a host of dramatic characters. These poets are 
the Shelleyan "unacknowledged legislators of the world." The same 
kind of speculation, phrased in more personal or limited terms, ap-
pears near the end of the Chameleon-Poet letter: "But even now I 
am perhaps not speaking from myself; but from some character in 
whose soul I now live" (I, 388). 
The annihilation of self by means of empathy need not involve 
identification with living persons: the imaginative experience may 
begin and end with the imagination. As Keats felt the power of his 
imagination strengthening, he felt increasingly that he did "not live 
in this world alone but in a thousand worlds," surrounded by 
"shapes of epic greatness." "Then Tragedy, with scepter'd pall, 
comes sweeping by.' According to my state of mind I am with 
Achilles shouting in the Trenches or with Theocritus in the Vales of 
Sicily" or with Shakespeare's Troilus, into whom he throws his 
"whole being .. . and ... melt[s] into the air" (24 Oct. 1818: I, 
403-404). At this time Keats was working on Hyperion. 
Either way, there is a dramatic outpouring of the self into some 
other being or thing, which may produce poetic results as different 
as the Blakean lines of "Where's the Poet?"-" 'Tis the man who 
with a bird, I Wren or eagle, finds his way to I All its instincts" (II. 
8-10)-and the "Ode to a Nightingale." The lesser poem is an exer-
cise in definition: to the Keatsian poet even "the tiger's 
yell I Come,s articulate, and presseth I On his ear like mother-
tongue" (II. 13-15). The Nightingale Ode, by contrast, is structured 
like the record of an exploration, ending on a question. It was writ-
ten by a Shakespearean poet of Negative Capability, who "is ca-
pable of being in uncertainties, Mysteries, doubts, without any irri-
table reaching after fact & reason .... With a great poet the sense 
of Beauty overcomes every other consideration, or rather oblit-
erates all consideration" -or calculation, or deliberation (27[7] Dec. 
1817: I, 193, 194).U Dilke, with whom Keats had had a "disquisi-
tion," was again the catalyst for a new insight. The opposing terms 
or concepts are of interest, suggesting as they do a quite Byronic 
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distrust of elaborate intellectual systems of thought : a fine isolated 
truth vs. systematic fact and reason (or, put another way, the single 
unique insight vs . a comprehensive, reasoned system) , "the sense of 
Beauty" vs . "consideration. " This is rather early Keats, although as 
late as 24 September 1819 he could find in Dilke the very opposite 
of tl}e man of Negative Capability (II, 213). Nevertheless, Keats 
came increasingly to reconcile such opposite or seemingly discor-
dant pairs of elements as beauty and truth, "consequitive reason-
ing" and the real need for knowledge. And paradoxically, it was 
Keats's talent for avoiding the "irritable reaching" after self-justifica-
tion in argument that encouraged him to seek reconciliation of his 
contraries. 
An example of such reconciliation occurs even in the letter on 
Negative Capability, where Shakespeare's Lear provides the 
example of "the excellence of every Art," which is "its intensity, 
capable of making all disagreeables evaporate, from their being in 
close relationship with Beauty & Truth" (I, 192). To evaporate, one 
may recall, is to change a liquid (or a solid) into gaseous form by 
means of heat: to transform, in other words, the apparent nature of 
reality, even as Wordsworth and Coleridge had planned to do in 
Lyrical Ballads, as they divided up their labors, "by awakening the 
mind's attention from the lethargy of custom, and directing it to the 
loveliness and the wonders of the world before us."12 The world, in 
short, was to be transformed in the mind by the poem and its 
beauty truly revealed. So it was also, Keats perceived, in Lear, a 
play not only of transformation (Lear himself) but also of revela-
tion (Cordelia reveals her true self to Lear, Edgar to his father 
Gloucester) and reconciliation. 13 Unlike West's painting of Death on 
the Pale Horse , in King Lear the "unpleasantness," the "repulsive-
ness," is buried-it is dead, not alive-by the "momentous depth of 
speculation excited" by the play. The "disagreeables" have been 
transformed because of the "speculation" to produce finally an 
imaginative thing of "Beauty" (I, 192). 
Keats wrote a great deal about beauty,· associated with truth not 
only by the Grecian Urn. When he said that he could never "feel 
certain of any truth but from a clear perception of its Beauty" (31 
Dec. 1818: II, 19), he meant that the effect of beauty was therapeu-
tic and ethical. "The mighty abstract Idea I have of Beauty in all 
things stifles the more divided and minute domestic happiness" (24 
Oct. 1818: I, 403), which is to say, as Blake expressed it, "You 
must leave Fathers & Mothers & Houses & Lands if they stand in 
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the way of Art."14 .As late as February 1820, he expressed regret 
that he had created "no immortal work," but, he added as a kind of 
counterweight, "I have lov' d the principle of beauty in all things" 
(II, 263). Such love also strengthens the spirit by making it inde-
pendent or inner-oriented: "Praise or blame has but a momentary 
effect on the man whose love of beauty in the abstract makes him a 
severe critic of his own Works" (8 Oct. 1818: I, 373). But Keats's 
most extended and profound exploration of beauty and associated 
subjects occurs in his letter of 22 November 1817 to Bailey, which 
expresses a good part of his esthetics. Here we learn that it is love, 
like all the other "Passions': in their sublime form or aspect, which 
is "creative of essential Beauty" (I, 184), thus transforming our 
vision of life and revealing its true nature. Keats refers to a passage 
in Endymion (I, 777-815) where love is sung and celebrated as the 
great creative force that activates the imagination and permits rich 
and "self-destroying" "enthralments" (II. 799, 798). These lead En-
dymion to his final realization that Cynthia and the Maid of Sor-
row are one. The feminine characters have been reconciled-heaven 
and earth have been reconciled-and Endymion finally sees the 
truth, led to it by his imagination. As Keats explained to his pub-
lisher John Taylor, the writing of this passage toward the end of the 
first book of Endymion "was a regular stepping of the Imagination 
towards a Truth" (30 Jan. 1818: I, 218). Thus the creative imagina-
tion, as Keats had written Bailey on 22 November 1817, "may be 
compared to Adam's dream" of the creation of the beautiful Eve: 
"he awoke and found it truth" (I, 185). There she was, the first fe-
male universal particular, palpable and meaningful, symbol of all 
others to follow. 
As for the Maid of Sorrow, subject of Keats's "little song" of 
Book IV, Endymion's relations with her extend his knowledge of all 
that Cynthia represents: the essential beauty, the ultimate truth or 
reality, includes the "human" maiden. This is the truth that the 
imagination first seized or recognized as Beauty. Sorrow has been 
transformed, as in Lear, and opposite or discordant qualities recon-
ciled in union at the end. 
Keats's highly speculative discussion in the letter to Bailey, which 
includes the exclamation "0 for a Life of Sensations rather than of 
Thoughts" (I, 185), begins with a sentence on beauty, truth, and 
imagination. "I am certain of nothing but of the holiness of the 
Heart's affections and the truth of Imagination-What the imagina-
tion seizes as Beauty must be truth-whether it existed before or 
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not-for I have the same Idea of all our Passions as of Love they 
are all in their sublime, creative of essential Beauty" (I, 184). It is a 
single sentence, and the latter part illuminates the earlier-and says 
essentially the same thing: Love, Keats writes, is "creative of" -it 
does not create-the essence of Beauty. But it is the imagination 
that is the precedent term, and it is the primarily creative power. 
For "what the imagination seizes as Beauty," or makes it own or 
apprehends as Beauty, must exist-"whether it existed before or 
not" (I, 184). That which is newly or freshly apprehended is in fact 
newly created. As Blake said, "Mental Things are alone Real" or 
truly existent. 15 Shelley expressed the idea somewhat differently: 
"nothing exists except but as it is perceived."16 The imaginative and 
sensual apprehension of that which is ideal-" 'a Vision in the form 
of Youth,' a Shadow of reality to come" -is clearly different from 
truth arrived at by "consequitive reasoning" (I, 185). Keats had 
"never yet been able to perceive how any thing can be known for 
truth" by this means. And yet this same letter moves on to describe 
"a complex Mind-one that is imaginative and at the same time 
careful of its fruits-who would exist partly on sensation [experi-
ence acquired through the senses] partly on thought-to whom it is 
necessary that years should bring the philosophic Mind" (I, 186), as 
in Wordsworth's Intimations Ode. Thus the extreme, discordant ele-
ments have again been reconciled. 
This is not to deny that there is in Keats's thought a strain of an-
tirationalism, which may express itself in terms quite Wordswor-
thian in their wise passiveness: "let us not therefore go hurrying 
about ... buzzing here and there impatiently from a knowledge of 
what is to be arrived at: but let us open our leaves like a flower 
and be passive and receptive-budding patiently under the eye of 
Apollo" (19 Feb. 1818: I, 232). "Diligent Indolence" may become a 
richly productive state of mind reconciling opposite, normally dis-
cordant qualities (I, 231). All poets wait passively for the Spirit of 
the muse to descend upon them, including Byron when the "estro" 
is upon him. 17 However, Keats's "What the Thrush Said" is to be 
read in the same way that one reads Wordsworth's "The Tables 
Turned." Neither poem asserts that every man on every day will 
learn more from a single impulse of a vernal wood than all the 
sages can teach. Keats was capable of writing on 27 February 1818 
that "if Poetry comes not as naturally as the Leaves to a tree it had 
better not come at all" (I, 238-239). Similarly, the effect of the 
poem upon the reader should seem to be a natural thing: "the rise, 
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the progress, the setting of imagery should like the Sun come nat-
ural [to the reader]-shine over him and set soberly" (I, 238). One 
is reminded here of Shelley's great painting growing as naturally 
"under the power of the artist as a child in the mother's womb."IB 
Nevertheless, Keats did indeed fret after knowledge. The need to 
possess it became central for him. However, he drew a distinction 
between systematic, abstract reasoning, distrusting it as deeply as 
Blake and Byron distrusted it, and genuine knowledge. Temper-
amentally, all three poets were unfitted to put on the show of logic 
that Godwin, for example, was capable of. Keats wrote, as we have 
seen, that he did not wish to be a "Reasoner" because he did not 
care "to be in the right" (I, 243). Apollonius is his fallen Urizen-
figure. Keats's "Read me a lesson, Muse," written upon the top of 
Ben Nevis, measures the distance between his mind and Words-
worth's on Mount Snowdon, the elder poet finding there with mag-
nificent certainty "the emblem of a mind I That feeds upon infinity, 
that broods I Over the dark abyss ."19 Keats upon the summit of 
Ben Nevis wrote a symbolist poem also, but the sullen mist he 
found provided him with a symbol of ignorance (to be overcome), 
not knowledge. Dilke, whose mind ran on nothing but Political Jus-
tice and his son, was one of "the stubborn arguers" of the world 
who "never begin upon a subject they have not preresolved on" (24 
Sept. 1819: II, 213), This way of proceeding allows for no progress 
at all, of course, and illustrates the kind of sterile, uncreative think-
ing that is the opposite of the insight characteristic of the poet of 
Negative Capability. 
Such a poet or poetic thinker thirsts after knowledge, the highest 
form of which is knowledge of the suffering human heart. The felt 
need of such knowledge or understanding can be almost over-
whelming in its intensity: "I find that I can have no enjoyment in 
the World but continual drinking of Knowledge" (24 April1818: I, 
271). In the Mansion of Life letter "an extensive knowledge 
... helps ... to ease the [Wordsworthian] Burden of the Mystery" 
(3 May 1818: I, 277). Wordsworth "is a Genius and superior [to] 
us, in so far as he can, more than we, make discoveries, and shed a 
light in them," that is, illuminate the "dark Passages" of human life 
that the older poet explored in Tintern Abbey. England has pro-
duced "the finest writers in the world" because the English have 
caused them to suffer and to observe the suffering of "the festerings 
of Society" (9 June 1819: II, 115). Thus when "Knowledge enor-
mous makes a God of" Apollo, it is chiefly knowledge of human 
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suffering, of "gray legends, dire events, rebellions, I 
... agonies, I Creations and destroyings" (Hyperion, III, 113-116). 
Apollo's "aching ignorance" (1. 107) before his transformation pre-
cisely parallels Keats's own state of mind when composing his son-
net "Why Did I Laugh Tonight": "it was written with no Agony but 
that of ignorance; with no thirst of any thing but knowledge" (19 
March 1819: II, 81). 
Although Keats thought that poetry "should strike the Reader as 
a wording of his own highest thoughts, and appear almost a Re-
membrance" (27 Feb. 1818: I, 238), he also knew that "Memory 
should not be called knowledge" (I, 231). Blake called it "the ratio 
of all we have already known," but insisted that it "is not the same 
that it shall be when we know more."20 Knowledge, Keats wrote, is 
created by "original Minds" and expresses itself in the form of "a 
tapestry empyrean-full of Symbols for [the] spiritual eye" (19 Feb. 
1818: I, 231, 232). Keats had confidence that such originality, al-
though obscured "by Custom," is possessed by many men. 
Except allego~ically, and not very clearly, as Apollo dies into 
new life, Keats does not explain the nature of the new perception 
that transforms the Endymion-like youth into a god. However, de-
spite Apollo's passivity, Keats's own theories of perception assumed 
a most active mind and imagination, very different from the pale 
personification of Memory, which is Mnemosyne and with whom 
Keats was obviously dissatisfied. With one great revisionary leap 
from Mnemosyne to Juno Moneta (the admonisher), Keats achieved 
that point where Blake began: "Imagination has nothing to do with 
Memory."21 Moneta also recalls one of Blake's giant forms, and her 
allocution implies clearly that the poetic imagination cannot truly 
exist unless it is an ethical imagination, feelingly alive to the "giant 
agony of the world" (The Fall of Hyperion, I, 157). Then "sure a 
poet is a sage; I A humanist, physician to all m~n" (I, 189-190). 
This ethical imagination, which presupposes that the poet feel em-
pathetically with all that lives, is a distinguishing characteristic of 
English Romanticism. -
16 THE KENTUCKY REVIEW 
NOTES 
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